ESSAY
THE GAINS AND LOSSES
OF CORRECTIVE JUSTICE
ERNEST J. WEINRIBt

I. THE PROBLEM OF GAIN AND Loss
In Aristotle's classic account, corrective justice eliminates
wrongful gains and their correlative losses.' The question I address in this Essay is, what is the nature of these gains and losses?
According to Aristotle, liability is the law's response to an
unjust gain by the defendant that is correlative to the plaintiff's.
unjust loss. Because the unjust transaction has caused the defendant to gain what the plaintiff has lost, corrective justice links the
parties in a bipolar relationship that mirrors the bipolarity of the
wrong being corrected. Thus, the correlativity of gain and loss
accounts for the nexus between a particular defendant and a particular plaintiff.
Nevertheless, even sympathetic readers of Aristotle's text are
often puzzled by his reference to correlative gain and loss.2 Aris-

t An earlier version of this Essay was presented at the Duke University School of
Law as the Annual Brainerd Currie Memorial Lecture on March 18, 1994. I would like
to thank Dean Pamela B. Gann and the faculty and students at the Duke University
School of Law for their hospitality. I am particularly grateful to Martin Stone for his
comments after the lecture.
Portions of this article are drawn from the forthcoming book, THE IDEA OF PRivATE LAW by Ernest Weinrib, to be published by Harvard University Press in 1995.
Copyright © 1995 in such portions held by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. Reprinted by permission of Harvard University Press. Copyright © 1994 in the
remainder held by Ernest Weinrib.
1. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS V.4.1131b25-1132b20 (Ingram Bywater ed.,
1894). Translations of Aristotle in this Essay are by the author.
2. Two recent examples are George P. Fletcher, Corrective Justice for Moderns, 106
HARV. L. REv. 1658, 1668 (1993)

(reviewing JULES COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS

(1992) and noting that injury and gain may be in disequilibrium in "risk-taking" situations), and Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV.
449, 457 (1992) (arguing that Aristotle's claim "does not seem to apply where the gainer's gain is not equal to the loser's loss").
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totle seems to require that the gainer's unjust gain be equivalent
to the loser's unjust loss. Only property takings clearly conform to
this requirement. In contrast, most tort cases involving accidental
harms feature a loss by the plaintiff from which the defendant
realizes no corresponding gain.
Though this difficulty of corrective justice is usually raised in
the tort context, it has wider application. Just as tort law compensates for losses that are unaccompanied by a correlative gain, so
the law of unjust enrichment can require the restitution of gains
by the defendant that are unaccompanied by losses to the plaintiff. In such cases, the very term "restitution" seems problematic,
because the law grants plaintiffs what they never lost.' These cases too, it would seem, fall outside the ambit of corrective justice.
The apparent vulnerability, on both sides, of the notion of
correlative gain and loss casts doubt on the comprehensiveness of
Aristotle's conception of corrective justice. Aristotle treats the
correlativity of gain and loss as the organizing idea for the liability
of defendant to plaintiff. Yet that idea seems inapplicable to wide
swaths of modern private law. Consequently, the difficulty of including accidental losses has prompted the call for a "corrective
justice for moderns."5 This new corrective justice in fact turns out
to be a form of distributive justice and thus is categorically different from corrective justice as Aristotle understood it.' "Corrective
justice for moderns" continues Aristotle's terminology, but abandons his idea.
In this Essay, in contrast, I hold on to Aristotle's idea while
recasting the terminology of gain and loss. As I have written elsewhere, Aristotle's idea of corrective justice is indispensable to
understanding private law as a coherent normative practice.'
Aristotle's specific terminology, however, stands on a different
footing. Aristotle wrote at the dawn of legal philosophy, for a
society with a less-developed private law than our own. It is not
surprising, therefore, that better terms, drawn from subsequent

er's gain is not equal to the loser's loss").
3. Some of the better-known cases of this sort are mentioned infra Part VI.
4. Lionel D. Smith, The Province of the Law of Restitution, 71 CANADIAN B. REV.
672, 694-99 (1992) (suggesting that "disgorgement" rather than "restitution" is the appropriate term to describe the law's response to unjust enrichment through wrongdoing).
5. Fletcher, supra note 2, at 1658.
6. Id. at 1668.
7. Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403, 425 (1992).
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thinking about private law, are now available. Indeed, I shall argue that Aristotle's correlativity of gain and loss refers to the
correlativity of right and duty, an idea that we have inherited
from Kantian reinterpretation of Aristotle's original notion.
Aristotle, I believe, would not be averse to such terminological recasting. This is evident from his comment about the very
difficulty that bothers contemporary scholars. After remarking that
the judge takes away the wrongdoer's gain, Aristotle observes,
"Gain" is what it is generally called in such cases, even though in
certain cases it is not the appropriate term, for instance, for one
who struck another-and "loss" for the one who suffered-but
when the suffering is measured, it is called a loss for one party
and a gain for the other.8
In this passage, Aristotle treats the assaulter's lack of material gain
as nothing more than a terminological problem that does not
greatly trouble him. Instead of excluding assaults from corrective
justice, he merely affirms that "gain" is what the outcome for the
defendant is generally called, however inappropriately. He then
cryptically indicates that the plaintiff's loss is identical to the
defendant's gain.
My comments in this Essay can be regarded as amplifying
Aristotle's observation that "when the suffering is measured, it is
called a loss for one party and a gain for the other."9 Aristotle is
pointing here to some notional equivalence of gain and loss that
obtains even if commission of the wrong has not materially enriched the wrongdoer. My task is to explicate this notional equivalence.
Despite my focus on Aristotle's text, I conceive this task as
philosophical rather than exegetical. My aim is not to draw conclusions from Aristotle's words, let alone to reconstruct his mental
processes, but to follow through on the conceptual implications of
his account. Aristotle's exposition of corrective justice presents a
series of ideas about the internal structure of what we now know
as private law. I propose to explore the interconnections among
these ideas, to illuminate them through the philosophical tradition
of corrective justice, and to relate them to familiar features of
private law.

8.

ARISTOTLE, supra note 1, at V.4.1132a1O-14.

9. Md
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Accordingly, this Essay has the following shape. After outlining the role of correlativity in Aristotle's treatment of corrective
justice, I distinguish between two conceptions of gain and loss-the
material and the normative. I argue that Aristotle's remarks on
correlativity refer only to normative gains and losses. The terminology of gain and loss, as Aristotle himself tells us, reflects not a
condition for liability, but the quantification of damages at the
remedial stage. I then contend that Aristotle's notion of
correlativity must be understood as referring to the Kantian rights
and correlative duties that govern the interactions of free agents.
Finally, I indicate how these conclusions about correlativity resolve
the difficulty of lack of gain in tort cases, as well as the parallel
difficulty of lack of loss in unjust enrichment cases.
II. THE ROLE OF CORRELATIVITY
Aristotle describes corrective justice as follows. Corrective
justice deals with the relationship of the doer and the sufferer of a
wrong. From the standpoint of corrective justice, the two parties
are equals, and justice consists in vindicating their equality. The
doer's unjust treatment of the sufferer disturbs this equality, leaving the doer with a gain and the sufferer with an equivalent loss.
To reestablish the initial equality, corrective justice requires the
doer to repair the loss by returning the gain to the sufferer. Thus,
a single operation eliminates both gain and loss. Aristotle compares the position of the two parties to lines of equal length.'"
The injustice consists in attaching to the doer's line a segment of
the sufferer's, thereby producing an inequality that is twice the
length of the segment. The judge restores the equality by removing the segment from the doer's line and reattaching it to the
sufferer's.
Aristotle's account makes salient the interdependence of the
two parties under corrective justice. Corrective justice does not
view the gain and the loss as discrete phenomena that happen to

coincide. The sufferer loses by virtue of the doer's gain, and vice
versa. Gain and loss are correlatives because each is constituted by
the other. Similarly, the judge's reestablishment of the parties'
equality does not consist of two independent operations, one of
which removes the gain and the other of which repairs the loss.

10. Id. at V.4.1132b6.
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The doer is directly liable to the sufferer, so that reparation of the
loss occurs through disgorgement of the gain.
By directly linking the parties, corrective justice categorically
differs from distributive justice, the other form of justice that Aristotle describes.1 Distributive justice involves sharing a benefit or
burden in accordance with some criterion. Instead of linking one
particular party to another as doer to sufferer, distributive justice
links all parties to the benefit or burden in which they share. Accordingly, distributive justice differs from corrective justice by not
being restricted to two parties. Whereas the addition of parties in
corrective justice is inconsistent with its structure, the addition of
parties in distributive justice merely decreases each person's share
of what is distributed.
Two important points are implicit in Aristotle's account of
corrective justice. The first concerns the connection between the
two particular parties. In considering liability, we might wonder,
why is the victim of harm entitled to recover from this particular
defendant, rather than from someone more evil or more capable
of bearing the expense of liability? Similarly, why is the defendant
liable to this particular sufferer rather than to someone more
needy or more virtuous? Formulated negatively, i.e., as why these
others cannot sue or be sued, the answer is that considerations like
wealth, need, and character provide no ground for connecting
individual litigants. Even on the assumption that redistribution is
desirable, a potential defendant's character and financial resources
are not reasons for making a particular plaintiff (as opposed to
others in need) the beneficiary of that person's wealth. Similarly,
the plaintiff's need and virtue are not reasons for requiring anything of this particular defendant, rather than of others who are
similarly situated."2
Aristotle treats the correlativity of the defendant's gain to the
plaintiff's loss as the positive reason for connecting the two particular parties. Because correlativity links two and only two terms, it
provides a reason for connecting two parties to the exclusion of
everyone else. Under corrective justice, liability is the juridical
manifestation of the logic of correlativity.

11. Id. at V.4.1131a10-b24.
12. Such operations belong to distributive justice, which apportions benefits and bur-dens among everyone who ought to participate in their distribution.
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The second point deals with the nature of adjudication. Under
corrective justice, rectification responds to the injustice being rectified. The court's action is the reflex of the wrong, not the commencement of a new juridical sequence. Judges cannot, therefore,
view the wrongdoing as a sunk cost that leaves them with the task
of determining, all things considered, what is best for society. The
sole function of the judge-"justice ensouled," in Aristotle's
graphic phrase 13 -is to undo the injustice of the correlative gain
and loss. The structure of correlativity that characterizes the injustice necessarily characterizes the rectification that reverses that injustice.
The problem of gain without apparent loss (and vice versa)
arises at the conjunction of these two points. The mirroring of
injustice through rectification means that the payment of damages
by the defendant restores the loss that the plaintiff suffered
through being wronged. The connection between the parties requires that this loss by the plaintiff be correlative to a gain by the
defendant. But then how does corrective justice include tort cases
in which the wrong does not benefit the defendant and restitution
cases in which the plaintiff does not lose through the defendant's
unjust enrichment?
III. Two CONCEPTIONS OF GAIN AND Loss
To answer this question, we must determine more precisely
what Aristotle means by gain and loss. These words signify excess
and shortfall relative to some baseline. What is the baseline?
One possibility is that gain and loss are variants from each
litigant's antecedent resources. We may call this the "material"
conception of gain and loss, because it focuses on the extent to
which the litigant is materially better or worse off than before the
wrong. The material conception of gain and loss refers to the
effect of the interaction on the amount or condition of one's resources (broadly construed to include both one's body and the
external objects at one's disposal). In its material aspect, a gain is
an increase in a party's resources; a loss is a decrease.
A second possibility is what we may call the "normative"
conception of gain and loss. Under this conception, gains and
losses refer to discrepancies between what the parties have and

13. ARISTOTLE, supra note 1, at V.4.1132a22.
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what they should have according to the norm governing their
interaction. The baseline for normative gains and losses is one's
due under the relevant norm. A gain is an excess over, and a loss
a shortfall from, one's due.
Suppose, for example, that you negligently injure me. A comparison of my present and previous conditions.reveals that I am
materially worse off than I was before. This is the material conception of the loss. In addition, however, I am also worse off than
I should be, given the norm against negligent injuring.14 The loss
considered from the .standpoint of this norm falls under the normative conception. The material and the normative conceptions
are both present in this example, because the negligent injury that
makes me materially worse off than I was before is also the injury
that I should not have suffered, given the norm against negligence.
They are, however, analytically distinguishable: if you injure me
nontortiously, the loss I suffer falls under the material conception,
but because you have breached no norm, the normative conception
of loss is inapplicable.
The distinction between material and normative gains and
losses allows the possibility that a gain or loss of one type may be
unaccompanied by a gain or loss of the other. All the possible
combinations are recognized in sophisticated systems of private
law. A party may realize (1) a normative gain but no material
gain: if I negligently injure another, I am liable for my wrongdoing, but my resources have not been increased by the wrong; (2) a
material gain but no normative gain: if another mistakenly paves
my driveway without my knowledge, my resources have been increased, but I owe the improver nothing; (3) a normative loss, but
no material loss: if someone trespasses on my property without
impairing its condition, a common law court may award me nominal damages to mark the breach of a norm, despite the absence of
material loss; or (4) a material loss, but no normative loss: if
someone injures me without fault, I generally cannot recover despite the impairment of my physical condition.
Given the two conceptions of gain and loss, what precisely has
to be correlative to what if there is to be liability under corrective
justice? The logic of correlativity requires that what is predicated
14. Conversely, as the tortfeasor, you have more than you ought to have, given that
you have breached the norm against negligent injuring. Liability forces you to surrender
this excess over your due.
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of one element in the pairing also be predicated of the other. s
Accordingly, the gains and losses must be of the same kind. We
can, therefore, eliminate the possibility of a material loss correlative to a normative gain or of a material gain correlative to a
normative loss. We are then left with the question of whether
corrective justice features a correlativity of material gain to material loss, or of normative gain to normative loss.
The first of these alternatives can be readily eliminated, because the correlativity of exclusively material gains and losses
makes no sense. We cannot tell what constitutes a material gain or
loss for purposes of corrective justice until we situate gain and loss
within a normative framework. The problem is that while material
loss operates from the baseline of one's antecedent resources, the
connection between resources and the person holding them has an
unavoidably normative dimension. Resources are "mine" only if I
hold them legitimately, and legitimacy entails the operation of a
legitimating norm. Changes in resources can function as the basis
of rectification only once the normative connection between resources and claimants is settled, and then the gains and losses are
no longer exclusively material ones. 6
In particular, unless we determine whether and under what
conditions the freedom to act (or to abstain from acting) is included among the resources of potential defendants, corrective justice
cannot work at all. This is clear in situations of nonfeasance, in
which the failure to act allows the materialization of an independently arising risk of harm. In such cases, a regime of exclusively
material gain and loss is unable to determine whether the consequent injury is a material loss caused by the failure to act or
whether the freedom to abstain from acting is itself an entitlement
whose exercise does not infringe corrective justice. The same applies to cases of misfeasance, for if the freedom to act is within
15.
Another topic is derived from correlatives. If to have done rightly or justly may
be predicated of one, then to have suffered similarly may be predicated of the
other. Similarly with ordering and executing an order. As Diomedon the taxcontractor said about the taxes, "If selling them is not disgraceful for you,
buying them is not disgraceful for us." And if rightly or justly can be predicated of the sufferer, it can equally be predicated of the doer, and if of the doer,
then also of the sufferer.
ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC II.23.1397a23-27 (W.D. Ross, ed. 1959).
16. Even in the case of a taking, in which the appropriator's gain is materially
equivalent to the victim's loss, liability follows not from the equivalence, but from the
breach of a property norm.
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the defendant's resources, the supposed injustice of injuring the
plaintiff could be corrected only by fettering the defendant's freedom, thus causing a new material loss (this time to the defendant)
that would itself be the grounds for a correction. Corrective justice
would thereby become an endless series of injustices, in which
each successive material loss would trigger another correction that
itself would create a material loss. 7
That Aristotle means the gains and losses of corrective justice
to be normative is evident from his treating equality as their baseline. If material gains and losses were involved, the equality would
have to be material as well. Corrective justice would then require
that the parties to any transaction have equal resources at the
transaction's inception. Corrective justice would be unavailable to
the victim of a tort, for instance, unless the victim and the tortfeasor had equal resources when the tort was committed. Aristotle
cannot be read as committed to so strange a conception. Equality
of resources concerns the distribution of resources within society
and is thus a matter for distributive, rather than corrective, justice.
Since the categorical difference between corrective and distributive
justice is thematic in Aristotle's account, the former ought not to
be subsumed under the latter by making the baseline for corrective justice itself a distributive notion. To put the same point in a
different way, since corrective justice is the juridical expression of
the logic of correlativity, the equality that serves as the baseline
for the gains and losses of corrective justice must itself participate
in that correlativity by applying to two parties and no more.
Equality of resources fails because it can exist among any number
of parties.
In Aristotle's account, equality is merely a formal representation of the norm that ought to obtain between doer and sufferer.
Action that conforms to this norm, whatever it is for any transaction, maintains the equality between the parties, so that no complaint is justified. Action that breaches this norm produces a gain
to the injurer and a loss to the person injured; then the court
17. For a related criticism of Robert Nozick's use of the Lockean proviso, see Ernest
J. Weinrib, Right and Advantage in Private Law, 10 CARDozo L. REV. 1283, 1293-97
(1989); see also Perry's illuminating remarks about Coase's theorem, Perry, supra note 2,

at 465. A case whose orientation towards material loss brings it close to the regress
presented here is Spur Industries v. Del E. Webb Development Co., 494 P.2d 700, 708

(Ariz. 1972), in which the defendant-tortfeasor succeeded in securing an entitlement to
compensation for the loss it would suffer under the injunction awarded to the plaintiff.
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restores the parties to the equality that would have prevailed had
the norm been observed. The normative nature of the equality
indicates that the variations from that equality are also normative.
We can now see why the idea that corrective justice is inapplicable to the accidental injury is misguided. Underlying this idea is
the obvious fact that such an injury does not produce a material
gain for the tortfeasor, let alone a material gain that is equivalent
to the victim's material loss. This fact, however, is irrelevant, because corrective justice is concerned with the correlativity of normative, not material, gain and loss.
In the Aristotelian account, the terms "gain" and "loss" are a
way of representing the occurrence of the injustice that liability
rectifies. What matters is whether the transaction can be regarded
as yielding the defendant more and the plaintiff less than the parties ought to have, given the norm that should have governed their
interaction.18 In tort cases, therefore, liability for injuring the
plaintiff is predicated not on some parallel increase in the defendant's resources, but on the defendant's having unjustly inflicted
that loss. Similarly, in the case of unjust enrichment, the plaintiff
recovers the defendant's gain not when the plaintiff has suffered a
corresponding material loss, but when the defendant's enrichment
represents an injustice to the plaintiff.
IV. THE TERMINOLOGY OF "GAIN" AND "Loss"

One might object that my argument so far shows only that
corrective justice does not concern material gain and loss exclusively, but also concerns normative gain and loss. Perhaps corrective
justice requires material gains and losses in addition to normative
ones. Then liability would depend not only on the occurrence of a
wrong but on the defendant's having materially gained-and the
plaintiff's having materially lost-through the wrong. Otherwise,
why did Aristotle invoke gain and loss at all in explaining the
correlativity of corrective justice?
Supporting this objection is the fact that Aristotle's account of
corrective justice presents two formulations of correlativity. One
formulation refers to gain and loss;19 the other, to the doing and
18. Aquinas expressly observes that according to Aristotle "loss is called so from one
having less than he should have." 37 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE II-II,

question 62, art. 5, at 113 (Thomas Gilby trans., 1975).
19. ARISTOTLE, ETHICS, supra note 1, at V.4.1132a10, a16, b12.
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suffering of injustice." (Sometimes he even combines the two in a
barely comprehensible jumble.21) Gain and loss, one might think,
represent the correlativity in material terms, with the increase in
the wrongdoer's resources being at the cost of a decrease in the
victim's. The doing and suffering of injustice, on the other hand,
might represent the correlativity in normative terms, as the active
and passive poles of one person's wronging another. These two
formulations might be read as separate conditions for corrective
justice, so that normative gain and loss alone are insufficient. The
result would be that a tort through which the defendant does not
materially gain and an unjust enrichment through which the plaintiff does not materially lose would fall outside corrective justice.
Such a reading would be unsound. First, Aristotle has no
reason to exclude such injustices from what purports to be a comprehensive account of justice. Second, correlativity of material gain
and loss is conceptually superfluous. The essential feature of the
ground of liability-what characterizes the bipolar claims under
corrective justice and distinguishes them from the possible openendedness of distributive justice-is the correlativity that structures
the parties' relationship. Such correlativity is fully satisfied when
the defendant's action wrongs the plaintiff.
Aristotle's comment on the use of the terms "gain" and "loss"
confirms that corrective justice does not require material correlativity:
"Gain" is what it is generally called in such cases, even though in
certain cases it is not the appropriate term, for instance, for one
who struck another-and "loss" for the one who suffered-but
when the suffering is measured, it is called a loss for one party
and a gain for the other.'

20. Id. at VA1132a5 ("If one has committed and the other has suffered injustice, and
if one has harmed and the other been harmed."); id. at V.4.1132a8 ("When one has hit
and the other been hit, and when one has killed and the other has been killed."). I be-

lieve that "harm" has a normative connotation, referring not merely to a physical event
but to what is actionable, as is the case in Aristotle's listing of the three kinds of harm,
id. at V.8.1135b10.
21. Id.at V.4.1132a8 ("The doing and the suffering have been unequally divided.").
As I hope the argument in this Part substantiates, the reason that Aristotle allows himself to combine these two formulations within a single clause is that he regards them as
equivalent and therefore as interchangeable.
22. Id. at V.4.1132a10-14.
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Far from signifying a separate condition of liability, gain is simply
what the suffering of injustice is "generally called

. . .

when...

measured."' Gain and loss are not additional to wrongdoing;
rather, they are its quantified manifestations. Thus, Aristotle's text
makes explicit what is implicit in his argument: that wrong to the
victim suffices for corrective justice in the absence of material gain
by the wrongdoer.
Aristotle's observation about measurement alludes to the role
of monetary damages in the rectification of wrongs. These damages translate the doing and suffering of wrong into quantitative
terms. Once perpetrated, the wrong is no longer only the breach
of the norm, the doing of an act that should not have been done;
it is now also an injury that the defendant must undo to the extent possible. Through the notion of damages, this injury takes the
form of something repayable: a monetary amount is debited
against the defendant's moral account with the plaintiff, and the
payment of this sum discharges the defendant's liability and wipes
the ledger clean. Damages maintain the correlativity of the parties'
positions by making the amount that represents the doing of the
wrong identical to the amount that represents the suffering of

wrong. These amounts are the same because they quantify the
same wrong. That is why "when the suffering is measured, it is
called a loss for one party and a gain for the other."'24
23. Id.
24. Id. Aristotle's comment is the earliest adumbration of the role of value in corrective justice. Value is the concept tbrough which a qualitatively unique phenomenon (my
particular injury, for example) receives the quantitative expression that permits it to function within a juridical relationship. The qualitative uniqueness of the injury figures only
within the experience of the injured party. Value quantifies the injury, so that the injurer
can discharge the liability generated by it. By thus connecting the parties at the remedial
stage, value serves the same correlative function that the norm serves at the stage of
conduct. On the role of value in corrective justice (or, as Hegel calls it, in "abstract
right"), see GEORG W. FRIEDRICH HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 1 98, at 69 (T. M.

Knox trans., Oxford University Press 1951) (1821); see also id. 9J 63, 77, 101. Hegel
characterizes value as "the inner equality of things which in their outward existence are
specifically different . . . in every way." Id. 1 101, at 72. On Aristotle's contribution to
the theory of value, see Scott Meikle, Aristotle and the Political Economy of the Polls, 99
I. HELLENIC STUD. 57 (1979).
The use of value implies that for juridical purposes the injury is commensurable
with monetary damages. No support, however, thereby accrues to economic analysis or to
the idea that values are commodities. The quantification of a breached entitlement operates only remedially and does not affect the judgment that the injury was a wrong and
that the defendant committed an injustice in causing it. But see Margaret J. Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE LJ. 56, 64-66 (1993). Radin's suggestion that
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For Aristotle, then, the terms "gain" and "loss" have currency
only because he reads them back into the relationship from its
remedial stage. They are not conditions of liability. The absence of
a material gain by the tortfeasor or of a material loss by the victim of unjust enrichment is, therefore, irrelevant. All that liability
under corrective justice requires is that one person have wronged
another. The gains and losses in Aristotle's text are nothing but
quantitative representations of the doing and suffering of wrong.
Properly understood, they refer to surpluses and shortfalls not
from what the parties had before the unjust act, but from what the
parties ought to have in view of the requirements of corrective
justice.
V. RIGHT AND DuTY

I want now to indicate why the correlativity inherent in corrective justice corresponds to the Kantian conception of right and
correlative duty. To see this, we must focus on the reason for the
norm that underlies normative gain and loss. Corrective justice
presupposes some reason (or set of reasons) for regarding certain
acts as wrongful and for rectifying their consequences. Normative
gains and losses are surpluses and shortfalls from what the parties
should have when that reason, whatever it is, applies to their relationship. Normative gain (the condition of having more than one
ought to) exists when that reason justifies decreasing the defendant's resources; normative loss (the condition of having less than
one ought to) exists when that reason justifies increasing the
plaintiff's.
Because corrective justice embodies correlativity, a reason that
accords with corrective justice must apply equally to both parties.
Application to only one of the parties could not account for the
correlative effect on the other. A reason that applies only to the
plaintiff yields a normative loss and thereby justifies augmenting
the plaintiff's resources; it does not, however, justify decreasing the
defendant's. And the converse is true for a reason that applies
only to the defendant. However appealing such reasons might be,
they are incapable of fitting within corrective justice.

commensurability fits only within economic analysis or utilitarianism is refuted by the
example of Hegel.
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For example, the compensation rationale cannot be considered
a reason for tort liability within corrective justice. Since this rationale rests on the plaintiff's need in the aftermath of injury, it
does not encompass the defendant. Thus, although injury might be
thought of as a normative loss consisting in the shortfall from the
plaintiff's entitlement under the compensation rationale, that rationale provides no ground for regarding the defendant as having
unduly gained. At most, the plaintiff's need for compensation
justifies improving the plaintiff's situation; it does not justify taking
anything from the defendant. Accordingly, the compensation rationale does not support the defendant's liability to the plaintiff.
Conversely, suppose that a reason for liability applies to the
defendant but not to the plaintiff (for example, the deterrence
rationale for tort liability). Such a reason might be grounds for
penalizing the defendant. Plaintiffs who do not come within the
reason's reach, however, cannot be said to have less than they are
entitled to under it. In the light of such a reason the defendant
may be said to have too much unless held liable, but the plaintiff
cannot be said to have too little. Consequently, there is no reason
for the defendant's liability to the plaintiff.
Nor can correlativity be satisfied by a combination of reasons
that embrace both parties by applying separately to each of them.
For example, one cannot justify tort liability by reference to the
need both to deter actors and to compensate sufferers. To be sure,
such a combination produces a normative gain for the defendant
and a normative loss for the plaintiff. But because the reason for
thinking the defendant to have gained is not the same as the reason for thinking the plaintiff to have lost, the gain and the loss are
not normatively correlative. The combination of reasons may justify eliminating the gain and the loss through separate operations
that decrease the resources of the defendant and increase those of
the plaintiff. However, it does not justify directly linking the parties through the liability of corrective justice.
In contrast to such one-sided reasons, Kant's legal theory
presents reasons that are correlatively structured as right and duty.
Kant's legal theory is a philosophy of freedom that starts with the
operation of free will conceived as self-determining activity.' The
fundamental principle applicable to the interaction of self-deter25.

1991).

IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS

40-43 (Mary Gregor trans.,
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mining beings is that action should be consistent with the freedom
of whomever the action might affect.26 Rights-including those to
physical integrity,27 property,28 and contractual performance -- are the juridical manifestations of the freedom inherent
in self-determining activity. Action is therefore consistent with the
freedom of others when it is compatible with their rights. Having a
right implies that other actors are under the moral necessity to
refrain from infringing it. In Kant's words, rights are "moral capacities for putting others under obligations."3
The Kantian approach, then, links the interacting parties
through a right, on one hand, and a corresponding duty, on the
other. The right represents the moral position of the plaintiff; the
duty represents the moral position of the defendant. Right and
duty-and therefore plaintiff and defendant-are connected because the content of the right is the object of the duty. The Kantian principle that the action of one party should be consistent with
the freedom of another is satisfied when the action of one party
does not violate a duty, the freedom of the other manifests itself
in a right, and free will grounds both the right and the duty and
connects one to the other.
This conjunction of right and duty fulfills the requirement of
correlativity within corrective justice. The plaintiff's suffering consists in an injury to something to which the plaintiff has a right.
The defendant's wrongdoing consists in the breach of a duty owed
the plaintiff. The same reason applies to both defendant and plaintiff because the existence of the right is the reason for the existence of the duty. If the defendant, by breaching a duty owed to a
third party, injures something to which the plaintiff has a right,
there is no liability under corrective justice, because in that case
the duty breached is not correlative to the plaintiff's right.3' Similarly, if the defendant injures something to which the plaintiff has
26. Kant's formulation of this principle is: "Any action is right if it can coexist with
everyone's freedom in accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom
of choice of each can coexist with everyone's freedom in accordance with a universal
law." Id. at 56. My simplification in the text is for purposes of exposition only.
27. Id. at 63.
28. Id. at 82-90.
29. Id. at 90-95, 101-03.
30. Id. at 63 (brackets and emphasis omitted).
31. "The plaintiff sues in her own right for a wrong personal to her, and not as the
vicarious beneficiary of a breach of duty to another." Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162
N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928).
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a right by breaching a duty regarding something else in which the
plaintiff has a right, there is no liability under corrective justice.
When the duty breached is correlative to the plaintiff's right,
the same reason is the basis of the defendant's normative gain and
the plaintiff's normative loss. In the absence of liability, that reason is grounds for regarding the defendant as having too much
and the plaintiff too little. As Aristotle remarks, "[I]t is called a
loss for one party and a gain for the other."33 Liability then applies the defendant's normative gain to the elimination of the
plaintiff's normative loss. Because the normative gain and the
normative loss are correlative aspects of the same wrong, the
defendant's liability is identical with the plaintiff's entitlement to
rectification. Hence private law is a system of direct claims by
plaintiffs against defendants.
The parties' equality under corrective justice confirms the link
between Aristotle's account and Kant's legal theory. Whereas Aristotle regards equality as the baseline for gain and loss, Kant's
notion of self-determining agency supplies the meaning of that
equality. As Aristotle himself notes, the parties to a corrective
justice transaction are equal in a very peculiar way: the equality
abstracts from the particularity of the parties' social rank or moral
character to the sheer relationship of wrongdoer and sufferer.'
Corrective justice treats the parties as equals because all self-determining beings, regardless of rank or character, have equal moral
status. The conjunction of right and duty is simply this equality of
self-determining beings viewed juridically, from the standpoint of
the correlativity of one person's action and its effects on anoth5
er.3
32. In this respect, RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 281 (1934), which makes it a condition of liability for negligence that "the conduct of the actor is negligent with respect to
such interest or any other similar interest of the other which is protected against unintentional invasion," is closer to corrective justice than RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
281 (1965), which omits this clause. GEORGE C. CHRISTIE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
THE LAW OF TORTS 266 (2d ed. 1990).
33. ARISTOTLE, supra note 1, at V.4.1132a13.
34. "Whether a worthy person has taken from an unworthy person or vice versa
makes no difference ...[;] the law treats them as equals if the one does and the other
suffers injustice, and if the one does and the other suffers harm." Id. at V.4.1132a2-6.
35. For a more complete argument of the connection between corrective justice and
Kantian right, see Weinrib, supra note 7, at 422-25; see also Peter Benson, The Basis of
Corrective Justice and Its Relation to Distributive Justice, 77 IOwA L. REV. 515, 601-24
(1992). But see Steven J.Heyman, Aristotle on Political Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 851,
860-63 (1992).
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Aristotle's thinking antedates the evolution of rights as legal
and theoretical concepts. Thus, instead of focusing on the correlativity of rights and duties, he describes corrective justice through
the correlativity of gains and losses, while observing that "in certain cases gain is not the appropriate term."' Whatever his terminology, he must be understood as referring to what we now know
as rights and duties. For if we ask why the court returns what the
plaintiff has lost through the defendant's wrong, the only answer is
that the plaintiff has a right to it. And if the plaintiff is entitled to
the remedy, it must be-by Aristotle's own account of adjudication
as a response to wrong-that the right to this remedy mirrors the
right infringed through the defendant's wrongdoing.
VI. TORT LAW AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT

I began by addressing the apparent discrepancy between corrective justice as a theoretical idea and private law as a familiar
practice. As a theoretical idea, corrective justice features the
correlativity of gain and loss and thus seems to require that the
gainer's gain be equivalent to the loser's loss. As a familiar practice, private law recognizes liability when the tortfeasor realizes no
gain corresponding to the loser's loss and when the victim of unjust enrichment realizes no loss corresponding to the gainer's gain.
My suggestion has been that once we understand that the gains
and losses of corrective justice are normative rather than material,
the apparent difficulty dissolves.
Through the commission of a tort, the plaintiff suffers a normative loss, and the defendant a correlative normative gain. The
plaintiff's normative loss consists in the shortfall from what the
plaintiff is entitled to under the norm that the defendant's action
violated. Conversely, the defendant's normative gain consists in the
excess over what the defendant ought to have, given the defendant's violation of the norm that the duty reflects. Reparation of
the plaintiff's loss and removal of the defendant's gain are both
justified by the defendant's having violated a duty not to infringe
the plaintiff's right. Since normative gain and loss are correlative
to each other, the valuation of the loss to be repaired also supplies the measure of the defendant's correlative normative gain.37

36. ARISTOTLE, supra note 1, at V.4.1132all.
37. Under corrective justice, damages are compensatory, not punitive. Therefore, the
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As Aristotle remarks, "When the suffering is measured, it is called
a loss for one party and a gain for the other."3 Thus, tort liability conforms to corrective justice even when the tortfeasor realizes
no material benefit from the wrong.
Tort liability is a regime of right and correlative duty when it
contains the following elements." First, to recover in tort, the
plaintiff's injury must be to something that ranks as the embodiment of a right, such as personal integrity or a proprietary entitlement. It is not sufficient that the plaintiff has suffered the merely
material loss of being made worse off or of being deprived of a
prospective advantage.' Second, the defendant must have comcommon law jurisdiction whose attitude regarding punitive damages comes closest to
conformity to corrective justice is England, which, since Rookes v. Barnard, 1964 App.
Cas. 1129, 1131 (H.L.), has restricted punitive damages to cases of oppressive, arbitrary,
or unconstitutional goveinmental action, cases in which the defendant has calculated that
the gain from misconduct will exceed the compensation payable to the plaintiff, and cases
in which punitive damages are expressly authorized by statute. For a survey and discussion of different approaches to punitive damages, see generally Bruce Chapman & Michael Trebilcock, Punitive Damages: Divergence in Search of a Rationale, 40 ALA. L.
REV. 741 (1989).
38. ARISTOTLE, supra note 1, at V.4.1132a13.
39. I am claiming not that all instances of tort liability in any given jurisdiction conform to corrective justice, but only that they conform to corrective justice when they contain the elements that follow. There may well be instances of liability that do not contain
these elements (indeed, I suggest some infra notes 40, 42). Such instances cannot count
as corrective justice. Since I regard corrective justice as the structure for coherent private
law doctrine, see supra text accompanying note 7, I would regard such instances of liability as demonstrably incoherent. My main point is that the absence of material gain by
the wrongdoer is not what makes liability inconsistent with corrective justice.
40. For example, in Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114
So. 2d 357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959), cert. denied, 117 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 1960), the plaintiff hotel sued its neighbor for building a structure that cast an afternoon shadow on its
bathing area. In dismissing the action, the court remarked that the maxim sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas "does not mean that one must never use his own property in such a
way as-to do any injury to his neighbor.... It means only that one must use his property so as not to injure the lawful rights of another." Id. at 359 (citations omitted). The
same issue arises when the defendant causes economic loss by negligently interfering with
some facility that is not owned by the plaintiff but is essential for the plaintiff's business.
E.g., Caltex Oil v. The Dredge "Willemstad," 136 C.L.R. 529 (1976) (Austl.) (pipeline);
Norsk Pacific Steamship Co. v. Canadian Nat'l R.R., [1992] 1 S.C.R. 1021 (Can.)
(bridge); Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd. v. Martin & Co. (Contractors), 1973 Q.B. 27 (Eng.
C.A.) (power line); Cattle v. Stockton Waterworks Co., 10 L.R.-Q.B. 453 (1875) (tunnel).
Historically, the common law denied recovery except to the extent that the economic loss
was a quantification of the damage done to something that embodied the plaintiff's right.
The economic loss standing on its own was insufficient for liability. The historic common
law result is in accord with corrective justice. More recently, Commonwealth courts have
experimented with allowing recovery as long as they feel that the claim can be limited
through notions of proximity. See Caltex Oil, 136 C.L.R. at 555-56. See also the opinions
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mitted an act that violates a duty incumbent on the defendant and
thus can be regarded as wrongdoing. Accordingly, modem common law emphasizes the importance of fault, since the defendant
is duty-bound not to perform the intentional or negligent acts that
constitute faulty conduct. 41 Third, the duty breached by the defendant must be with respect to the embodiment of the right whose
infringement is the ground of the plaintiff's cause of action.42
When the defendant thus breaches a duty correlative to the
plaintiff's right, the plaintiff is entitled to reparation. The remedy
reflects the fact that even after the commission of the tort, the
defendant remains subject to the duty with respect to the plaintiff's right. The defendant's breach of the duty not to interfere
with the embodiment of the plaintiff's right does not, of course,
bring the duty to an end, for if it did, the duty would-absurdly-be discharged by its breach. Given the occurrence of wrongful
injury, the only way the defendant can discharge his obligation
with respect to the plaintiff is to undo the effects of the breach of
duty. Just as the plaintiff's right constitutes the subject matter of
the defendant's duty, so the wrongful interference with the right
entails the duty to repair. Thus, tort law places the defendant
under the obligation to restore the plaintiff, insofar as possible, to
the position the plaintiff would have been in had the wrong not
been committed.
These observations about tort liability apply, mutatis mutandis,
to the law of unjust enrichment. As far as correlativity is concemed, the law of unjust enrichment is the mirror image of tort
law. Whereas tort law allows recovery for material loss that is un-

favoring liability in Norsk Pacific Steamship Co., [1992] 1 S.C.R. at 1022-25. The problem

of limiting recovery, however, presupposes that one has located (as these judgments have
not) the entitlement with respect to which the recovery is to be limited.
41. Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292, 298 (1850).
42. See supra notes 31-32. Corrective justice allows one to understand why the doctrine of transferred intent, under which the defendant is held liable for harm done to
one person as a result of an act performed with the intent to harm another, is indeed
"something of a freak," as it is termed in WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., TORTS: CASES
AND MATERIALS 29 (7th ed. 1982). This doctrine, exemplified in Talmage v. Smith, 59
N.W. 656, 657 (Mich. 1894), in effect holds that there is liability even when the defendant's breach of duty is not correlative to the plaintiff's infringed right. The doctrine is
discussed in William L. Prosser, Transferred Intent, 45 TEX. L. REv. 650 (1967). Prosser
treats the doctrine as a curious survivor of the criminal law aspect of the old writ of

trespass. PROSSER ET AL., supra, at 29. Aside from the dictum by Chief Justice Latham
in Bunyan v. Jordan, 57 C.L.R. 1, 12 (1937) (Austl.), there is, to my knowledge, no trace
of this doctrine in Commonwealth tort law.
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accompanied by material gain, the law of unjust enrichment allows
recovery for material gain that is unaccompanied by material loss.
The possibility of gain without loss presents a well-known crux
for the law of unjust enrichment. 43 How can the defendant's gain
be said to be "at the expense of" the plaintiff if the plaintiff is not
worse off as a result of it? Suppose, for example, that the defendant profits through the unauthorized retention of machinery that
its owner would not have used; or that the defendant commercially exploits a cave that opens only onto his property but runs
beneath his neighbor's as well;' or that a fiduciary profits from
an opportunity that could not practically or legally be exploited by
the principal;- or that a soldier stationed abroad accepts bribes to
let smugglers past checkpoints.47 In each of these cases, the defendant gains without inflicting a correlative material loss on the
plaintiff. The owner of the machinery can invoke no use that was
frustrated; the neighbor has no way of exploiting a cave to which
he has no access; the principal can point to no profit that the
fiduciary intercepted; and the soldier's government cannot claim
that it would have received the bribe pocketed by the soldier.
Nonetheless, in all these situations, the law grants these plaintiffs
restitution of what they never had and would not have received.
These examples of restitutionary liability rest on normative
rather than material correlativity. In each case the defendant has
wrongfully infringed the plaintiff's right, either by using the plaintiff's property or by infringing the plaintiff's entitlement to loyalty
or by abusing a position within the plaintiff's service. Correlative
to each of these rights is a duty owed by the defendants. Because

43. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 cmt. e (1937); PETER BIRKS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 12, 41 (1985); 1 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF
RESTiTUTION 134 (1978); Smith, supra note 4, at 673-82.

44. Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 173 P.2d 652, 653-54 (Wash. 1946); Strand Elec. &
Eng'g Co. v. Brisford Entertainments, Ltd., [1952] 1 All E. R. 796, 798 (Eng. C.A.); see
J. BEATSON, THE USE AND ABUSE OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT. ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF

RESTrIION 230-34 (1991); E. Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss or My Gain? The Dilemma
of the Disgorgement Principle in Breach of Contract, 94 YALE LJ. 1339, 1354-69 (1985);
Daniel Friedmann, Restitution of Benefits Obtained Through the Appropriation of Property
or Commission of a Wrong, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 504, 508, 518-19 (1980).
45. Edwards v. Lee's Adm'r, 96 S.W.2d 1028, 1031-32 (Ky. Ct. App. 1936). For a
recent discussion of this and similar cases, see John Glover, Restitutionary Principles in
Tort: Wrongful User of Property and the Exemplary Measure of Damages, 18 MONASH U.
L. REV. 169, 173-77 (1992).
46. Keech v. Sandford, 25 Eng. Rep. 223, 223-24 (1726).
47. Reading v. Attorney-General, 1951 App. Cas. 507, 511-12 (H.L.).
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the defendants' gains are the embodiments of the breaches of the
duties, the plaintiffs are as entitled to the gains as they were to
the duties. Because it is the excess over what the defendant ought
to have in view of the breach of duty, the gain is also the correlative shortfall from what the plaintiff is entitled to as a matter of
right. To paraphrase Aristotle, when the defendant's unjust enrichment is measured, it is called a gain for one party and a loss for
the other.4"
CONCLUSION

Starting with the correlativity of gain and loss in Aristotle's
conception of corrective justice, I have suggested that these gains
and losses are to be understood normatively (as relative to the
parties' due) rather than materially (as relative to the parties'
preexisting resources). The remedy due, in turn, depends on the
reasons for regarding it as due. These reasons themselves must
reflect in the correlativity of corrective justice by applying equally
to both parties. The correlativity of right and duty in Kantian legal
theory meets this requirement. The result is that the tortfeasor
need not materially have gained nor the claimant of restitution
materially have lost for liability to exemplify corrective justice.
That the structure of the private law of reparation and restitution conforms to corrective justice should not be surprising. By requiring a single justification to apply correlatively to both litigants,
corrective justice shows how private law can be a coherent normative phenomenon. Otherwise, the relationship between the parties
would be torn apart in the tug of mutually independent reasons.
As long as private law is a practice in which reasons and justifications matter, corrective justice will be the key to understanding it.
And at the heart of corrective justice, linking the two parties, lies
the correlativity of the normative categories of right and duty.

48.

See supra text accompanying note 8.

